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A Climate for Change?  Critical Reflections on the Durban United Nations Climate 
Change Conference 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite more than 15 years of high level efforts led by the United Nations to broker 
a binding agreement on emissions reduction, negotiations at every annual meeting have 
failed to establish a global agreement mainly due to significant disagreements between 
industrialized and developing countries over differentiated responsibilities in reducing 
emissions.  In this paper I describe my experiences as a participant-observer at the 17th 
United Nations Climate Change summit held in Durban, South Africa during December 
2011.  I provide a critical analysis of the political economy of climate change and discuss 
power dynamics between market, state and civil society sectors as well as the shifting 
geopolitics that marks the emergence of China and India as major players in the climate 
change arena.  
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A Climate for Change? Critical Reflections on the Durban United Nations Climate 
Change Conference 
 
ǮSaving Tomorrow Todayǯ – UN Durban Climate Conference mission statement 
 
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow 
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day 
To the last syllable of recorded time; 
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools 
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle! 
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage 
And then is heard no more. It is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing 
Macbeth Act 5, Scene 5. 
 
Introduction 
It has been sixteen years since world leaders first gathered together in Berlin as part 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to discuss 
global impacts of climate change, and means to combat global warming.  Since then the 
Conference of the Parties (or as described uncharitably by some critics as the Conference of 
the Polluters) has met every year in an attempt to develop a binding global agreement to 
address climate change.  The landmark Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997 at the third 
Conference of the Parties (COP3) was the worldǯs first international agreement that set 
binding targets for industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.  However, since then negotiations at every annual meeting have failed to 
establish a global agreement, mainly due to significant disagreements between 
industrialized and developing countries over differentiated responsibilities in reducing 
emissions.  The 2009 conference at Copenhagen was widely regarded as being critical to 
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producing a global agreement, especially given that the Kyoto protocol was due to expire in 
2012.  However, far from reaching a global agreement the failure of Copenhagen 
highlighted the depth of distrust and disagreement between and within industrialized and 
developing countries (Carter et al., 2011).  These divisions and power blocs became even 
more entrenched at the Cancun conference of 2010, which also failed to deliver a global 
agreement. 
  It was in this context of uncertainty and intractable differences between 
industrialized and developing countries along with the United Statesǯ steadfast refusal to 
ratify the Kyoto protocol and their opposition, along with China and India, to agree to 
legally binding emissions targets that the Durban conference was held during November 
28–December 9, 2011.  Given the hype of Copenhagen and its spectacular failure, 
expectations that Durban would result in any agreement were low.  Fears of another global 
recession, the ongoing political stalemate in the United States, concerns about the future 
of the Eurozone and the relentless economic growth and concomitant increases in GHG 
emissions of China and India loomed large over the Durban conference.   
In this paper I describe my experiences at the Durban Climate Change Conference or 
more accurately the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 7th Session of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP7) to the Kyoto 
Protocol, which I attended with the formal affiliation of an Ǯobserverǯ belonging to a Ǯnon-
governmental organizationǯ (NGO), the University of Western Sydney.  The paper makes 
two contributions: first, it describes the organizational processes of international climate 
change negotiations and analyzes the power dynamics between market, state and civil 
society actors.  Much of the literature on business and climate change has examined how 
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firms respond to climate change issues (Hoffman, 2005; Kolk, 2005).  The influence of 
major corporations and their industry associations in climate change negotiations has not 
received much attention — notable exceptions being the work of Levy & Egan (2003) and 
Newell & Paterson (1998) — and this paper describes how institutional and discursive 
strategies arising from the market-state nexus shape climate policy regimes at the 
international level.  Second, the paper analyzes the geopolitical shifts and the emergence 
of new coalitions in the climate change arena.  The emergence of China and India as key 
players in the global economy has created new fault lines in the North-South divide and 
political alliances that have characterized climate change negotiations since their inception 
during the late 1980s.  I show how these shifting coalitions influence the politics of climate 
change.   
The paper is structured as follows: first, I discuss the political economy of climate 
change negotiations and describe the power dynamics between key actors and institutions.  
The organization of global negotiation processes and the inclusions and exclusions that 
result can influence outcomes of negotiations, creating policy regimes that can have 
profound consequences for society (Depledge, 2004).  Second, I provide a backdrop to the 
Durban conference and describe my experiences as an observer of the negotiation process.  
Third, I analyze the power dynamics between market, state and civil society actors that 
constitute the political economy of climate change and describe how these dynamics 
influenced the outcomes of the Durban conference.  Durban marked a shift in the 
geopolitics of climate change with the emergence of Brazil, India and China as powerful 
players in the global arena.  I conclude by discussing future prospects for any global 
agreement on climate change. 
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The Political Economy of Climate Change 
Insights from international relations, in particular regime theory, have been the 
conventional approach to understanding global negotiations conducted under the auspices 
of bodies like the United Nations or the World Trade Organization.  Following from a liberal 
tradition, international institutions or regimes determine the nature of cooperation and 
conflict between nation states in the global political economy.  These regimes establish 
particular codes of behavior to which states as rational actors are expected to conform in an 
attempt to seek international cooperation (Krasner, 1982).  However, regime theory does 
not provide a sophisticated understanding of how power, particularly the institutional, 
material and discursive power of capital, is exercised in the political economy (Levy & Egan, 
2004; Newell & Paterson, 1998).  In era of neo-liberal globalization the rationality of the 
state is contingent on providing and maintaining the conditions necessary for capitalist 
accumulation.   
Thus, the nexus between the state, transnational capital, corporations and their 
industry associations transforms the role of the state from a Ǯguarantor of societyǯs 
progressǯ ȋDonzelot, ͙͡͠͠: ͛͡͝Ȍ to protecting and promoting economic interests, which are 
generally consistent with corporate interests.  Economic competitiveness obtains its social 
legitimacy through an ideology whereby Ǯprogressǯ and Ǯdevelopmentǯ can be achieved only 
by production and consumption of goods and services.  Discursive power operates in the 
political economy by only allowing solutions to environmental problems like climate 
change that do not challenge the developmental model nor adversely affect corporate 
competitive strategies.  Institutional logics and institutional power along with the material 
power of large corporations ensure that certain groups have the capacity to direct 
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enormous resources towards providing solutions that sustain hegemonic interests (Perrow, 
1979).  Consequently the market-state nexus favors big technology solutions like carbon 
capture and storage or geo-engineering as preferred ways to address climate change, 
emissions trading as the preferred mode of reducing emissions, and private banks as 
providers of the necessary financial infrastructure.  The state becomes Ǯthe most powerful 
promoter of commercial organizations as the means of fulfilling its public 
obligation…Public decisions rest more and more on the economic rather than in the 
political sphereǯ ȋDeetz, ͙͚͡͡: ͚͘Ȍ.  A critical perspective on the political economy of climate 
change locates power as the central unit of analysis and will enable us to understand how 
particular climate change regimes are created and sustained (Payne, 2005).   
 
Constructing the Climate Change Regime 
Drawing from critical perspectives on political economy, notably the work of Cox 
(1981) and Payne (2005), we can describe the structure of a climate change regime as being 
contingent on relationships between material capabilities, ideas and institutions.  
Configurations of these three forces shape prospects and constraints on climate change 
action.  Material capabilities include natural resources, technology and industrial 
infrastructure.  Ideas refer to accepted notions about contemporary social relations as well 
as Ǯcontested ideologies about alternative social ordersǯ ȋPayne, ͚͘͘͝: ͙͟Ȍ.  Particular 
arrangements of ideas and material capabilities are sustained by institutions that are in turn 
subject to the same forces of change.  It is also important to understand that structural 
configurations of the political economy of climate change are also social constructions, 
Ǯpersistent social practices, made by collective human activity and transformed by 
collective human activityǯ ȋPayne, ͚͘͘͝: ͙͟Ȍ.   
 8 
In the context of climate change negotiations there is a fundamental and universally 
shared assumption that energy is a key driver of economic growth.  The power of the fossil 
fuel lobby emanates from this basic assumption and explains how their lobbying efforts in 
climate change negotiations have been successful.  The interests of states in ensuring that 
climate change regimes do not create any obstacles to economic growth thus coincide with 
the interests of the fossil fuel industry (Levy & Egan, 2004; Newell & Paterson, 1998).  
Discourses of climate change become inextricably linked with discourses of development 
where development and energy security are problems for both developing and 
industrialized countries.  Climate change negotiations involve several actors lobbying for a 
variety of positions where particular configurations of interests comprising of governments, 
institutions, corporations and transnational managerial elites or what Gramsci (1971) calls a  
Ǯtransnational historical blocǯ are able to exercise their structural power to ensure that any 
agreement would not harm their interests.   
The institutional logic of climate negotiations is dominated by an economic agenda 
whereby discourses of economic development take precedence over environmental 
sustainability.  Hegemonic structures constitutive of both coercive and consensual power 
establish and sustain a dominant ideology whereby market mechanisms such as carbon 
trading become the primary mechanism to reduce emissions and emphasis tends to be on 
voluntary rather than legislative measures (Böhm, & Dabhi, 2009; Bumpus & Liverman, 
2008).  Critics argue that apart from simplification of complex ecosystem damage, 
practices like carbon trading serve to impose a system of property rights that Ǯlicenses 
enclosures of land, air, water and labor in the global South to serve the Ǯcarbon needsǯ of 
the Northǯ (Lohmann, 2011: 101).   
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There are also complexities and inequalities in the organization of global climate 
negotiations.  Despite assertions by the organizers of climate negotiations that the process 
is inclusive and democratic, the fact remains that there are structural power inequalities 
among participating states that result in Ǯprocedural inequityǯ or Ǯthe unequal capacity of 
parties to participate effectively in negotiationsǯ ȋDepledge, ͚͘͘͜: ͙͘Ȍ.  Being allowed to 
participate in negotiations as a legitimate stakeholder does not mean that all participants 
have similar capabilities in making their voices heard.  In describing climate change 
negotiations, Depledge (2004) points to vast disparities in the size of delegations of 
countries that in turn influence negotiating capacity.  Negotiations typically involve several 
parallel sessions and smaller delegations find it impossible to participate effectively in every 
meeting that is held at the conference.   
Global environmentalism like global economic systems is also the outcome of 
power relationships between the institutional power of multilateral environmental 
institutions, the economic power of the industrialized nations and transnational 
corporations, and the discursive power of the Ǯenvironmental-economic paradigmǯ that 
allows the environment to be protected only by commodifying it and controlling its means 
of exchange (McAfee, 1999).  These power dynamics create a particular from of political 
rationality through a process of governmentality, where Ǯpower is exercised in the form of 
economyǯ aimed at shaping and guiding the conduct of environmental policies (Foucault, 
1979: 92).  Civil society and the public spheres are also informed by this rationality where 
the society and state interface is managed through the market.  Through the dynamics of 
discursive and institutional power, this market-state system positions itself Ǯaboveǯ society 
and its competing social forces while obscuring its key role in the accumulation process.  In 
the context of climate change negotiations governmentality as a form of Ǯsocial 
 10 
governmentǯ ȋGordon, ͙͙͡͡: ͚͜Ȍ isolates the economic in such a way that institutions and 
policies focus more on the anti-competitive effects of climate change regulation rather 
than on the negative environmental and social effects of unbridled economic growth.  As 
we will see later, the discourse of competitiveness dominated much of the negotiations at 
the Durban conference. 
 
Methods: I came, I observed, I participated and I interviewed 
The Durban conference was held during November 28 – December 9, 2011.  My 
intention in attending the conference was to document whatever I could, from the various 
meetings, workshops, panel discussions and daily press briefings that I attended, to the 
discussions and interviews I had with several delegates and my own observations about the 
conference and how events unfolded.  I did not approach the conference with specific 
questions — rather my aim was to observe the interactions between different actors and 
organizations, the actual processes of treaty and policymaking, the different coalitions and 
institutional arrangements between key actors and to understand the power dynamics 
between market, state and civil society sectors as well as between North-South countries.  I 
attended 3 plenary sessions, 4 working group meetings, 6 side-events, 7 workshops 
organized by industry groups, 4 presentations by environmental organizations, and 19 
panel discussions as well as the daily press briefings.  In addition, I interviewed 13 delegates 
from Australia, Brazil, China, Germany, India, South Africa, United Kingdom and United 
States representing industry groups, government agencies and environmental NGOs.  I also 
analyzed 121 documents and reports that were made available during the conference.  My 
description of what transpired in Durban including quotes from various participants is 
based on my field notes, document analysis, transcripts of interviews and panel 
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discussions.  Some of the panel discussions and interviews were audiotaped with the 
permission of respondents.  In all I had 43 audio files of panel discussions, workshops and 
one-on-one interviews totaling about 65 hours of conversation.  Table 1 lists the key 
participants of various meetings and panel discussions I attended, which were the primary 
sources of my data. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 around here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
eThekwini – The Place Where the Earth and Ocean Meet 
The city of Durban (eThekwini is the Zulu name for the city) was in full conference 
mode with banners and signs greeting and welcoming delegates from the airport to every 
corner of the main city.  On the way to my hotel I asked the taxi driver what he thought 
about climate change.  (e pointed to the nearby )ndian Ocean and said Ǯweǯre next to the 
ocean so we will have problems.  There are many poor people hereǯ.  ) asked him what he 
thought about the conference.  ǮA lot of hot airǯ he said with a smile.  Then as an 
afterthought he added Ǯbut this [the conference] is good for business.  We should have 
more of themǯ. 
The conference itself was held in the imposing International Convention Center in 
the heart of Durbanǯs business district, while the various exhibits, stalls, side events, and 
workshops took place at the adjoining Durban Exhibition Center.  As expected security was 
tight — delegates and observers were required to be affiliated with organizations approved 
by the United Nations and required formal UN approval to attend the conference.  Bar 
coded and color coded picture identity cards were issued on the basis of the affiliation and 
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status of participant.  There were metal detectors and screenings at every entry and exit 
point and identity cards were carefully scanned and checked on each occasion.  Hundreds 
of volunteers lined the streets to greet delegates and direct them to the venue, transport 
hub and hotels, and there was a palpable police presence in virtually every corner of the 
city. 
At Copenhagen there was much criticism about several preemptive arrests of 
activists made by Danish police even before the conference began (Rovics, 2010).  While no 
preemptive arrests were reported at Durban several local environmental activists I spoke 
with mentioned that the police had been in touch with them, inquiring about their plans for 
the conference.  Environmental groups also claimed that Ǯstrangersǯ attended their 
meetings and rallies and were seen taking notes and asking about the leaders of the group.  
There were several protest meetings planned and December ͛ was dubbed as the Ǯglobal 
day of actionǯ when nearly ͙͘,͘͘͘ protestors marched through the streets of Durban to 
present a list of their demands to the UN Secretariat.  Hundreds of protestors also occupied 
the penultimate plenary session at the conference venue.  Dozens of protestors, mainly 
environmental activists from Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth were deported during 
the first week of the conference. 
My initial reaction on entering the Convention Center was bewilderment and 
confusion, first about the geography and organization of the space, second about the 
status and affiliation of the thousands of people that were milling around, and third about 
the seemingly endless acronyms that described groups, meetings, initiatives, policies and 
actions, which can be overwhelming even for someone who is well versed in the workings 
of the UNFCCC.  One participant, a veteran of the last ͙͚ COPs, asked if ) was a ǮCOP virginǯ.  
On my replying in the affirmative she assured me ) would Ǯget the hang of itǯ in a couple of 
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days (I did).  A remarkable feature of the spatial dynamics was the physical separation 
between the venues of the COP meetings and the various exhibits and stalls that marked 
the presence of non-governmental actors.  A large outdoor sunlit space lined with food 
stalls and a stage where various singers, musicians and dancers performed throughout the 
day added a festive atmosphere to the occasion.  Mainly occupied by young people 
belonging to a variety of environmental NGOs this space seemed to be disconnected from 
the more formal confines of the convention center.  I overheard one excited young woman 
talking to her mother on her cell phone saying Ǯ)tǯs so much fun out here mom.  Sunshine, 
the crowds, the atmosphere and the energy is just so great.  ) havenǯt even been to the 
main conference yet — I hear itǯs deathly boringǯ.  Deathly boring or not, over the next ͙͘ 
days the spatial dynamics of the conference became a salient feature as I navigated my way 
through multiple venues of the main conference, the informal consultations, the seemingly 
endless working groups, the Ǯside events, the exhibitǯ, the media updates, the roaming 
interviews and the country pavilions.   
 
Durban:  The Players 
The conference provided an invaluable opportunity to observe policy making in 
action on a global scale as well as the roles played by market, state and civil society actors 
in climate negotiations.  The Durban conference was attended by an estimated 12,500 
participants including accredited delegates from 194 countries, representatives from 
corporations and industry associations, as well as nearly 6000 participants from NGOs, and 
1200 media members.  )t is important to point out that not all NGOs represent Ǯcivil 
societyǯ: in recent years there has been an increase in the number of business and industry 
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group NGOs1 (BINGOs) that occupy the civil society space in various trade and 
environmental fora including COP meetings.  The major oil corporations of the world like 
Shell and ExxonMobil, nuclear giants like Areva as well as multinational mining 
corporations like Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton have all funded various non-governmental 
organizations that promote particular resource and energy-use agendas.  Table 2 provides 
a summary of the key actors involved in climate change negotiations. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 around here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Individual countries, groups and coalitions that were formed at various meetings 
leading up to Durban had different positions on climate change.  These are summarized in 
Table 3.  As we will see later these differing interests led to conflicts, accommodation, 
compromises, disintegration of existing coalitions and creation of new alliances. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 around here 
---------------------------------------------- 
After thirteen days of hectic negotiations no agreement was in sight and there were 
signs that the talks would end in total collapse.  The talks were then extended by another 
day and a half although several ministerial delegates had returned home, and after three 
consecutive all-night sessions an agreement was finally reached at 3:30 in the morning of 
December 11.  At the final plenary session where some delegates were (quite 
                                                        
1
 The proliferation of NGOs over the last two decades has led to an almost incomprehensible and sometimes 
comical list of acronyms.  At Durban apart from BINGOs, there were TANGOs (Technical Assistance NGOs); 
GONGOs (Government-operated NGOs, designed to look like NGOs in order to qualify for overseas financial 
aid); QUANGOs (Quasi Autonomous NGOs); ENGOs (Environmental NGOs); NNGOs (Northern NOGOs); 
SNGOs (Southern NGOs); TNGOs (Transnational NGOS); MANGOs (Market Advocacy NGOs) and NGDOs 
(Non-governmental Development Organization) to name a few.  
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understandably) seen dozing off and others bleary eyed and barely able to speak, the 
Ǯagreementǯ that would govern carbon emissions starting from ͚͚͘͘ was announced.  This 
Ǯnegotiation by exhaustionǯ is an outcome of confrontational bargaining rather than 
cooperative problem solving and has been a common feature of almost every COP 
meeting, which raises questions about equity, transparency and quality of the agreements 
reached.  In fact, Depledge (2004: 193) argues that many of the discrepancies in the Bonn 
Agreement of COP6 were largely a result of the tiredness of negotiators. 
 
Durban: The Outcome  
So what exactly was achieved at COP17?  The answer depends on who one asks. 
UNFCCC and the organizers, anxious to put the failure of Copenhagen and Cancun behind 
them, took great pains to announce that a breakthrough deal was reached.  Titled the 
ǮPlatform for Enhanced Action', the agreement called for all major emitters — including 
developing countries such as China and India — to set legally binding emissions reduction 
targets by 2015.  EU leaders described the outcome at Durban as a Ǯhistoric achievementǯ, a 
Ǯwatershedǯ and Ǯa moment comparable to, if not surpassing, the success of COP͙ from 
͙͡͡͝ǯ — the agreement that led to the creation of the Kyoto protocol (Keating, 2011).  
Several green groups claimed that the agreement did not cover binding emissions cuts, a 
major objective of COP meetings, and hence COP17 was a failure.  A spokesperson for 
Friends of the Earth Europe, said it was Ǯnothing more than smoke and mirrors — an illusion 
of ambition with no real targets or timelinesǯ.  Mohamed Adow, a representative of 
Christian Aid, a non-governmental organization, described the outcome at Durban as 
Ǯdisastrous and profoundly distressingǯ and a Ǯcompromise which saves the climate talks but 
endangers people living in povertyǯ.  Celine Charveriat, Director of Advocacy for Oxfam 
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declared at a press conference that the ǮDurban Platform can only be described as a major 
disappointment. But the blame for this delay lies squarely on the shoulders of the US and 
other countries like Canada, Japan and Australia who dragged their feet from start to 
finishǯ.2  
The impasse that led to an extension of the talks was over the wording of the 
agreement: an earlier draft contained the phrase Ǯlegally bindingǯ, to which the Indian 
delegates objected.  The phrase was then changed to Ǯlegal outcomeǯ, which was opposed 
by the EU on the grounds that it was too weak.  The Indian delegation wanted to include a 
reference to Ǯequityǯ, which was firmly opposed by the United States who insisted that any 
agreement should have Ǯlegal parityǯ and not be subject to North-South divisions.  Finally, a 
compromise was reached and the wording was changed to Ǯa protocol, legal instrument or 
an agreed outcome with legal force under the convention applicable to all partiesǯ.  The 
agreement was to be developed by 2015 and would come into effect from 2020.  Until that 
time the only action on climate change would arise from the 90 plus countries that had 
agreed to make voluntary pledges to cut emissions (Clark, 2010).  While the Durban 
Platform reaffirmed the goal of holding global warming to no more than a 2 degrees 
Celsius increase, the agreement noted with Ǯgrave concernǯ that the stated pledges to cut 
emissions would not meet that goal. It was also no coincidence that the timetable 
coincided with the electoral schedule in the United States given the deep political divisions 
in that country and the very real possibility of a change in government and corresponding 
shift in US policy.  The promised agreement that would be developed in 2015 to become an 
Ǯoutcome with legal forceǯ by ͚͚͘͘ would be Ǯjust a scrap of paper for a President Romneyǯ 
(The Economist, 2011). 
                                                        
2
 Quotes excerpted from the daily press briefings. 
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Perhaps the most significant outcome at Durban was the further marginalization of 
the least developed countries that are the most vulnerable to climate change.  The United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted at the 1992 Rio summit 
acknowledged the differing responsibilities of developing and industrialized countries in 
addressing climate change.  Article 3 of the convention states: 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects. 
The principle of Ǯcommon but differentiated responsibilitiesǯ was further affirmed at 
subsequent COPs at Berlin and Bali.  The Berlin Mandate of 1995 interpreted the principle 
as Ǯlaunching a process to commit ȋby ͙͟͡͡Ȍ the Annex ) countries to quantified greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions within specified time periodsǯ and that the process should Ǯnot 
introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex )ǯ ȋStavins, ͚͙͙͘Ȍ.  
Industrialized countries like the United States, Canada and Australia have always opposed 
any differentiated responsibilities between developing and industrialized countries.  
Through a process of attrition starting at Copenhagen the distinction between Annex 1 and 
non-Annex 1 countries became blurred and at Durban there was a complete erasure of any 
distinction in the text of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action where there is no 
mention of Ǯcommon but differentiated responsibilitiesǯ, Ǯdistributional equityǯ or Ǯhistorical 
responsibilityǯ all of which had appeared in earlier drafts.  While this marks a victory for the 
industrialized countries there may be some space to negotiate equity-based targets in a 
future agreement since the UNFCCC mandate does accept the Ǯcommon but differentiated 
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responsibilitiesǯ principle.  However, the bargaining position of developing countries has 
weakened significantly as a result of the exclusion of any reference to equity. 
Further evidence that the Durban Platform compromised the interests of 
developing countries can be seen in the absence of any declaration on climate change 
adaptation or intellectual property rights on technology transfer.  The text of the Durban 
platform focuses almost exclusively on mitigation and ignores the demands of the least 
developed countries to include adaptation policies.  Countries vulnerable to climate change 
require adaptation assistance because even if there are zero emissions starting from the 
present time climate change impacts will still occur.  Equity was sacrificed in favor of 
agreeing on a legal instrument whose form remains unknown and whose enforcement is 
nonexistent (Jayaraman, 2011). 
There was also some confusion about when emissions reductions would actually 
commence — while the EU insisted that actual reductions would commence in 2020 several 
other countries claimed that there was enough flexibility in the wording to claim that 
targeted emissions cuts would commence Ǯany time after ͚͚͘͘ǯ.  Europe would continue a 
second period of binding emissions cuts under the 1997 Kyoto protocol, which was to 
expire in 2012.  Although the continuation of the Kyoto protocol was a desired outcome for 
COP17 Canada was the first signatory to formally withdraw from the protocol (Genova, 
2011).  Japan and Russia also refused to take on further Kyoto targets.  While Kyoto may 
have received a second lease of life its actual impact remains in question given the 
withdrawal of key countries, the continued lack of participation by the United States and 
China ȋthe worldǯs two biggest emittersȌ and the fact that the protocol covers less than 15 
per cent of global emissions.  Figure 1 provides a list of the 10 biggest emitters in the world. 
------------------------------------------------------- 
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Insert Figure 1 around here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Perhaps the most accurate description of the outcome of Durban was Ǯa deal to 
agree a dealǯ ȋ(arvey & Carrington, ͚͙͙͘Ȍ or a Ǯnon-binding agreement to reach an 
agreement by ͚͙͘͝ that will bring all countries under the same legal regime by ͚͚͘͘ǯ 
(Stavins, 2011).  The last-ditch deal was basically an understanding that developing and 
industrialized countries would work on an agreement that Ǯshould be legally bindingǯ for all 
parties.  Even the most optimistic observers agreed that resolving the many complex issues 
that remained would be a struggle, if not impossible. 
So how are we to understand the processes that lead to a particular outcome at 
high-level international summits such as COP?  What are the politics of domination that 
influence particular outcomes?  How do key actors legitimize their different positions? How 
are conflicts played out?  What are the discursive strategies that allow inaction to be 
legitimized?  These are some of the questions I will explore in an attempt to understand the 
politics of climate change. 
 
Conference of Parties – Power and Politics 
The fundamental question is why, despite nearly two decades of efforts at the 
highest level, is there still no global binding agreement on reducing GHG emissions?  If, 
despite the existence of some climate skeptics, there is universal agreement that climate 
change is a problem that needs to be urgently addressed then what is holding the world 
back?  These questions were addressed in a variety of forums at Durban and in my 
discussions with participants.  The most commonly cited reasons were: (1) lack of political 
will, ȋ͚Ȍ China and )ndiaǯs unwillingness to cut emissions, (3) opposition by the United 
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States, (4) power of the industry lobby, (5) levels of investment needed and possible 
negative effects on competitiveness, and (6) complexities of reaching an agreement 
involving 194 countries.   
I was able to identify several discourses based on my observation and analysis of 
what transpired in Durban and a review of research on earlier COP conferences.  I call them 
the competitive discourse, the development discourse, the poverty discourse and the 
innocent victim discourse.  These interlocking discourses arose from the politics of 
domination and politics of legitimation that characterize the political economy of climate 
change (Carter et al., 2011).  These discourses are also marked by shifting coalitions of 
interests and groups as well as a range of discursive and institutional practices that 
promote particular interests to constrain any meaningful action on climate change.  
For developed countries the discourse was about competitiveness and market 
mechanisms that would enable emissions reductions at the lowest possible cost.  For the 
large developing countries like Brazil, China and India the discourse was about 
development; for the least developed countries the poverty discourse was paramount; and 
the innocent victim discourse reflected the position of low lying island states that had 
negligible GHG emissions but whose very existence was threatened by climate change.  
What these interlocking discourses produced at Durban was basically more inaction or 
delayed action through strategies of co-optation, direct threats, payoffs, and isolation. 
 
 
 
Climate Impasse: The Competitive Discourse 
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Competitive vulnerability was the main argument used by developed countries 
against binding emissions targets, particularly the United States, Canada and Australia. 
Canadaǯs withdrawal from Kyoto after the Durban conference is an example of the effects 
of the competitive discourse.  Announcing the decision at Durban, Canadaǯs Environment 
Minister Peter Kent stated that if Canada stayed in the Kyoto Protocol it would need to 
purchase $14 billion worth of emissions trading permits for not achieving its Kyoto targets, 
which would place the country at a competitive disadvantage.  Corporations and industry 
lobbies also played a key role in influencing their respective countryǯs position on binding 
emission reduction targets.  For instance, at Durban two influential industry associations, 
the International Council on Mining and Metals and the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development organized several side events with expert panels comprising of 
senior managers from leading mining and utilities corporations.  The impact of climate 
change agreements on the competitive position of their organizations was a key focal point 
in these discussions.  A senior manager from a leading metals manufacturer commented: 
What weǯre talking about here is the different carbon pricing policies may affect the 
relative competitiveness of facilities in different countries.  That could lead to increased 
imports, loss of company share and then in the longer term perhaps a more serious 
issue, at least in the UK, to promote relocation of facilities and where new facilities will 
be built (Transcript #3, Panel Discussion). 
A senior manager of one of the largest electricity producers in the United States 
stated: 
Today we face what we call the train wreck of EPA regulations coming at us all at one 
time.  We face something that ) think is the biggest hurdle weǯve ever faced in the — we 
estimate potentially 80 gigawatts of energy being shut down if all these regulations hit 
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at one time … And weǯre making some headway to get people to understand that weǯre 
not trying to blow up the Clean Air Act, weǯre trying to just not shut down plants while 
we build the controls in place.  So with that environment, the Republicans are saying no 
regulations, Democrats are saying we want to regulate to the impossible level, and 
weǯre kind of stuck in the middle so therefore we have trouble getting anything done … 
Inconsistent, multiple or overlapping government policies — I enjoyed writing that — 
which increase the price of electricity are likely to result in a distance from customers 
and can slow economic recoveryǯ (Transcript #7, Panel Discussion). 
The basic argument from industry sectors that were the largest emitters was the 
same: emissions reductions would be too costly and would erode the profitability of firms, 
lead to increased prices for consumers, slow economic recovery, give polluting competitors 
in developing countries an unfair advantage resulting in the closing down or relocation of 
plants.  Industry efforts to engage with policy makers at the national and international 
levels have been successful in the sense that both in the EU and at COP negotiations 
several regulatory proposals were either abandoned or watered down.  In a recent study of 
EU steel corporations Okereke and McDaniels (2012) found that the companies 
Ǯstrategically exaggeratedǯ their competitive vulnerability to carbon pricing in order to 
obtain preferential treatment under the European Emissions Trading Scheme.  At COP 
meetings aggressive lobbying by carbon intensive industries and the fossil fuel lobby 
influenced their respective countryǯs approach to negotiation as well as the actual content 
of agreements.  The basic aim was to promote Ǯflexibilityǯ in climate change policies where 
flexibility invariably meant the use of market mechanisms and voluntary, non-enforceable 
Ǯpledge and reviewǯ approaches to climate change (Newell & Patterson, 1998). 
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The institutional logics of competitiveness influence the climate agenda in ways 
that seem paradoxical to the goals of mitigation.  For instance, in 2011 the United States 
sued the Chinese government for providing Ǯunfair subsidiesǯ to its green industries, which 
they claim is a violation of Ǯfree tradeǯ ȋChina Times, ͚͙͙͘Ȍ.  China has invested more than 
$30 billion in developing its solar industry and is a world leader in solar technology.  US 
solar companies facing bankruptcy urged their lawmakers to sue China for unfair trade 
practices.  At the corporate level BP recently announced the closure of its solar power 
business claiming that Ǯthe continuing global economic challenges have significantly 
impacted the solar industry, making it difficult to sustain long-term returns for the 
companyǯ ȋMacalister, ͚͙͙͘Ȍ.  The companyǯs mission to move Ǯbeyond petroleumǯ has now 
truly been reversed back to petroleum given its annual expenditure of $20 billion on oil and 
gas development. 
 
Climate Impasse: Inactions as Actions 
There are a range of discursive strategies that allow corporations, institutions and 
governments to show action on climate change.  These are strategies that create 
legitimacy but do little to address the realities of climate change.  First, the focus is on 
setting goals, targets, carbon accounting and monitoring procedures all on a voluntary 
basis to obviate the need for legally binding targets.  Goals and targets are also framed in 
ways that are economically efficient rather than environmentally sustainable — for 
instance, a commonly used target is reducing emissions intensity per unit of output or GDP 
(as opposed to reducing overall emissions).  Even if emissions intensity targets are reached, 
growth in production and sales means that overall emissions will keep increasing.  Second, 
a range of experimental projects and demonstration plants such as renewable energy or 
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carbon capture and storage are launched, often through public-private partnerships that 
demonstrate Ǯstakeholder engagementǯ.  While these investments provide tax benefits to 
private corporations and are often funded by government grants they tend to remain at the 
experimental stage and are very rarely scaled subsequently on a commercial scale.  Third, 
where it is possible to demonstrate carbon neutrality through offsets, the strategy is to set 
goals to achieve carbon neutrality.  Thus, low emitting industries like financial services and 
banks tout their climate change credentials by claiming carbon neutrality.  Or, at the next 
level small countries that are low emitters develop mission statements for becoming 
carbon neutral to show it can be done.  However, the problem of scaling up remains 
unresolved.  Fourth, market, state and civil society actors engage in coalition building to 
demonstrate a commonality of purpose and action on climate change. 
 
Climate Impasse:  Corporate Political Strategies 
Industry strategies to address climate change also involve launching legal 
challenges to climate change legislation.  In 2009 the Air Transport Association, the lead 
industry association for US airlines, along with American Airlines, United Airlines and 
Continental Airlines sued the EU for new regulations capping jetliner emissions and 
requiring airlines to pay for exceeding emission limits (Reuters, 2009).  In December 2011 
Europeǯs highest court ruled in favor of EU regulations declaring that Ǯapplication of the 
emissions trading scheme to aviation infringes neither the principles of customary 
international law at issue nor the open-skies agreementǯ ȋThe Guardian, ͚͙͙͘Ȍ. 
However, industry attempts to influence climate negotiations have not gone 
unchallenged.  Many environmental organizations at COP17 targeted carbon intensive 
industries and their lobbyists.  For example, Greenpeace International organized an 
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elaborate display at their stall titled ǮWho's holding us back? (ow carbon intensive industry 
is preventing effective climate legislationǯ.  The exhibit described the power and influence 
of bodies like the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), that 
according to Greenpeace actively Ǯcampaigns for more access for companies to influence 
the architecture of an international climate agreementǯ.  The exhibit described lobbying 
activities of 7 multinational companies and members of WBCSD:  Shell, BASF, Arcelor 
Mittal, Tata, Koch Industries, Eskom and BHP Billiton, who along with industry associations 
such as the Petroleum Association of Japan, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 
European Chemical Industry Council, Business Europe, European Steel Association, 
American Petroleum Institute, US Chamber of Commerce and South African Energy 
Intensive User Group lobbied the governments of Japan, Canada, Australia, South Africa, 
the United States and the European Union to Ǯeffectively undermine climate legislationǯ.   
 Details of corporate political strategies in dealing with climate change are 
extensively documented in a ͚͙͙͘ report titled ǮCorporate, Climate and the United Nationsǯ 
prepared by the Polaris Institute (Fernandes & Girard, 2011).  Even the United Nationsǯ own 
reports document the rising influence of corporations in various UN bodies like UNICEF, 
UNDP, UNEP and WHO through public-private partnerships, consultancies, voluntary 
standards initiatives, advocacy and project financing (Utting & Zammit, 2006).  The main 
channels of corporate influence include direct lobbying of governments and international 
organizations, lobbying through industry associations and events, UN-business 
partnerships, corporate funding and investments.  Industry lobbyists are both part of 
official country delegations at the various COPs as well as Business and Industry NGOs 
(BINGOs), who as observers have access to some official meetings, side events, workshops 
and can make submissions to the UNFCCC.  The number of BINGOs participating in COP 
 26 
talks has been steadily increasing over the years with more than 2000 participating 
organizations at Copenhagen in 2009.  According to Fernandes & Girard, (2011) there were 
a total of 4201 lobbyists at all the COPs since 1995 from four major BINGOs — the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development, International Chamber of Commerce, 
International Emissions Trading Associations and the now defunct Global Climate Coalition 
(an association of mainly US businesses opposed to emission reduction targets and largely 
responsible for the US refusing to ratify the Kyoto protocol).  The main focus of lobbying 
efforts by carbon intensive industries was to slow down the negotiating process, block any 
outcome, oppose binding targets and taxes and promote market-based mechanisms as 
solutions for climate change that would allow firms to continue operating without 
significantly curbing emissions (Depledge, 2004; Fernandes & Girard, 2011). 
 
Climate Impasse: Inclusions and Exclusions 
While the UNFCCC, ministerial delegates and trade representatives take great pains 
to highlight the inclusive and democratic nature of climate change negotiations, pointing 
to the presence and participation of NGOS and environmental groups, the reality is that 
inclusions and exclusions are carefully orchestrated — from the granting of approvals to 
attend the conference, to the classification of participants as delegates or observers with 
the accompanying access privileges to the many Ǯclosed sessionsǯ.  The North-South divide 
in climate negotiations is also evident in NGO presence in climate negotiations.  In the last 
few COPs between 75– 90 per cent of NGOS were from developed countries. (Depledge, 
2004).  Business and industry NGOs are almost exclusively based in OECD countries.  While 
there is limited funding from the UN to assist delegates from developing countries to 
participate in climate change negotiations no such funding is available for NGOs from 
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developing countries. Negotiations at COP17, as in prior climate conferences, are both 
formal and informal.  While the formal sessions are usually open to accredited observers 
the informal sessions can be either open or closed.  There are also unofficial, behind the 
scenes meetings where the real deals are hammered out, usually in very small groups.  
Most of the actual negotiation sessions involving representatives of states were Ǯclosed 
sessionsǯ as were some of the Ǯinformal consultationsǯ among industry groups, NGOs, multi-
country networks, inter-governmental organizations and working groups.  Access to closed 
sessions was carefully monitored by security staff (I tried to enter one such session and was 
politely but firmly turned away).  As negotiating groups in informal sessions become 
progressively smaller they tend to be dominated by the more powerful delegations.  
Depledge (2004: 120) quoted a participant involved in the negotiations that led to the 
Kyoto Protocol:  
As the issues developed, there were smaller negotiating groups…and as the groups got 
smaller….then we started to lose out on participation and ….it just made it easier for 
countries who wanted to minimize the outcomes ….) guess the US is the classic 
example…..they were involved right to the end in the smaller and smaller groups. 
Thus, participation of NGOs and observers is severely constrained in sessions where 
most transparency is needed.  At Durban, there were criticisms from some of the least 
developed countries and civil society organizations at these closed room meetings — as a 
representative from a youth NGO said in her speech to the delegates Ǯyou give us a voice 
but no seat at the tableǯ.  Stakeholder engagement strategies at the policy level seem to 
mirror corporate strategies and have more to do with managing stakeholders than serving 
their interests (Banerjee & Bonnefous, 2011). 
 Perhaps the most significant reason for inaction is that climate change, while being 
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an environmental problem, is being engaged with as primarily a political and economic 
issue.  At the very first meeting of the parties to address climate change there was general 
agreement that a cooperative, collaborative and multilateral effort was required.  However, 
when negotiations commenced, the problem statement shifted from the ecology of 
climate change to the economics of climate change and it soon became evident that any 
agreement on climate change would essentially revolve around the economic impacts of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts.  Thus, while the aim of reaching an 
agreement on climate change was through cooperation and collaboration the negotiating 
process was competitive where the basic negotiating principle was Ǯgive as little as you can 
and extract as much as you canǯ ȋSaran, ͚͙͘͘Ȍ.  Any outcome from such a position would 
tend to favor the lowest common denominator, which is what all the climate change 
summits have produced so far.  The lowest common denominator in the climate change 
debate is energy security, which being the engine of economic growth means that climate 
change negotiations are primarily conducted on the basis of economic competitiveness.  
Thus, the institutional logics of competitiveness and markets through a combination of 
material, institutional and discursive power produce a politics of domination that 
overcomes a politics of legitimacy.  This process is enabled by creating shifting coalitions 
that transcend conventional North-South boundaries as we shall see in the next section. 
 
Shifting Geopolitics: From Climate Change to Climate Justice 
Climate change has disproportionate impacts across the globe.  Poor populations 
across the world face the gravest threat from climate change and have the least resources 
to adapt to or mitigate against climate change.  Developing countries argue quite justifiably 
that the use of the atmosphere has taken place in vastly unequal conditions over the last 
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300 years and that it would be unfair and unjust to expect countries that are trying to 
emerge from poverty to be treated the same as industrialized countries that are mainly 
responsible for GHG emissions.  There continues to be deep divisions between developed 
and emerging economies on each otherǯs role in reducing emissions.  Both China and )ndia 
along with Brazil have been opposed to mandated emissions cuts for all countries because 
they argue with some justification that historically it is the industrialized countries of the 
world that have contributed most to GHG emissions and therefore should be held 
responsible for reducing emissions while developing countries should focus their efforts on 
alleviating poverty. 
As in previous COP meetings the EU continued to play the world leader in pushing 
for a global climate change agreement.  EU negotiators went to great lengths to emphasize 
the legitimacy of their proposal for a legally binding agreement on emissions reductions.  
Their insistence on strong wording in the draft document was opposed by the United 
States on the grounds that any agreement had to have legal parity between all countries, 
which was opposed by developing countries since such an agreement would be counter to 
the Ǯcommon but differentiated responsibilitiesǯ principle.  Chinaǯs position was that it was 
Ǯnot averse to a legally binding agreementǯ (a significant shift from its earlier position that it 
would not accept any binding agreement) provided it was not bound to the same emission 
standards as the rich countries because more than ͙͘͘ million of Chinaǯs citizens still lived 
in Ǯpersistent povertyǯ (Reuters 2011).  )n explaining )ndiaǯs opposition to legally binding 
targets the Indian negotiator stated that she could not Ǯsign away the rights of ͙.͚ billion 
people and many other people in the developing worldǯ by agreeing to an outcome that 
could constrain these countriesǯ economic development ȋSheppard, ͚͙͙͘Ȍ.  The small island 
nations and least developed countries called for stronger measures and binding targets 
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arguing that even the internationally accepted 2 degree rise meant death for their 
populations and was a form of Ǯclimate fascismǯ imposed by the rich countries and powerful 
emerging economies like China and India. 
 The final plenary session saw several clashes erupt between the EU, USA and 
Canada on one side and China and India on the other.  The EU Commissioner for Climate 
Action, Connie Hedegaard, offered a commitment to continue the Kyoto protocol that 
would bind the rich countries to cut GHG emissions in exchange for a legally binding 
agreement involving all countries.  To cheers from the audience she declared: ǮWe need 
clarity.  We need to commit.  The EU has shown patience for many years.  We are almost 
ready to be alone in a second commitment period.  We donǯt ask too much of the rest of the 
worldǯ.  The Ǯrest of the worldǯ reference was to )ndiaǯs refusal ȋgreeted by boos from 
sections of the audience) to commit to any legally binding agreement. The Indian minister 
for the environment replying to Hedegaardǯs demand for all countries to agree to legally 
binding emissions cuts said:  ǮThe equity of burden-sharing cannot be shifted.  Am I to write 
a blank check and sign away the livelihoods and sustainability of 1.2 billion Indians, without 
even knowing what the EU ǲroadmapǳ contains?  I wonder if this is an agenda to shift the 
blame on to countries who are not responsible for climate changeǯ.  China backed )ndiaǯs 
position with their minister, Xie Zhenhua, accusing developed countries of not doing 
enough: ǮWhat qualifies you to tell us what to do? We are taking action.  We are doing 
whatever we should do.  We are doing things you are not doing.  We want to see your 
actionǯ ȋVidal & Harvey, 2011).  Given these intractable positions any compromise seemed 
impossible, thus any agreement that was ultimately reached needs to be unpacked 
carefully. 
 
 31 
Climate Power Blocs 
At COP negotiations power is exercised by industrialized countries in a variety of 
ways: through a strategy of divide and conquer, threats to withdraw aid funding, coercion, 
promises of additional funding, and isolating countries that object to the terms of any 
agreement.  Recently released WikiLeaks cables reveal how US diplomatic offices gathered 
information about other countriesǯ positions and then used financial aid and project 
financing to garner political support for the US position (Carrington, 2010).  Millions of 
dollars of US aid funding to Bolivia and Ecuador were withdrawn in 2010 due to their 
opposition to the Copenhagen Accord, while governments of smaller countries were 
rewarded with funding to support the US position at Copenhagen (Bond, 2011).  In an effort 
to gather support the EU Climate Action Commissioner, Connie Hedegaard, wrote to the 
US State Department stating that the Alliance of Small )sland States Ǯcould be our best 
allies, given their need for financingǯ ȋThe Guardian, 2010a).  The Maldives, possibly the first 
nation state that will cease to exist due to rising sea levels, mounted a global campaign to 
raise awareness about climate change and called for strict legally binding emissions 
controls.  Their initial opposition to the Copenhagen Accord was reversed because of a $50 
million aid package from the United States.  According to a leaked cable the US deputy 
climate change envoy informed the Maldivesǯ US ambassador that if Ǯtangible assistanceǯ 
were given to his country, then other countries would realize Ǯthe advantages to be gained 
by complianceǯ with Washingtonǯs climate agenda ȋThe Guardian, 2010b). 
A leaked cable reporting a meeting between the US Undersecretary of State and 
the Ethiopian Prime Minister in ͚͘͘͡, then head of the African Unionǯs climate change 
negotiations, contained a direct threat to Ethiopia to support the Copenhagen accord, 
failing which any promised financial aid would be suspended (The Guardian, 2010c).  
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Another leaked cable from the US Deputy National Security Adviser warned his EU 
counterpart about the increasing influence of developing countries, particularly the so 
called BASIC group of countries consisting of Brazil, South Africa, India and China: 
It is remarkable how closely coordinated the BASIC group has become in international 
fora, taking turns to impede US/EU initiatives and playing the US and EU off against 
each other. BASIC countries have widely differing interests, but have subordinated 
these to their common short-term goals. The US and EU need to learn from this co-
ordination and work much more closely and effectively together ourselves, to better 
handle third country obstructionism and avoid future train wrecks on climate, Doha or 
financial regulatory reform. 
The BASIC group was formed in 2009 and played a key role in Copenhagen, including 
staging a walkout to protest that their concerns were not being heard by the developed 
countries.  The US and EU seemed to have learned their lessons well because post-
Copenhagen they were able to garner the support of most countries in the African Union 
and other developing countries, and were successful in removing any reference to equity 
from the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. 
 As in Copenhagen, North-South climate politics dominated the Durban COP. Power 
politics were also played out in the various regional coalitions that emerged in Durban.  The 
leader of the Chinese delegation stated at a joint news briefing with his South African, 
Indian and Brazilian counterpoints:  
BASIC countries are united and demand that the second commitment of the Kyoto 
protocol is a must.  Developed countries should carry out their commitment they have 
made in cutting emission and giving financial assistance to help developing countries 
deal with climate change.  We are ready to do our due contributions on climate change 
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to make the Durban conference a success.  We will speak with the same voice (Xinhua 
News Agency, 2011). 
However, the South certainly did not speak with one voice — on several occasions the 
least developed countries voiced their concerns about the role of China and India in 
determining the interests of all developing countries and called for a legally binding 
agreement that included both those countries.  Karl (ood, Grenadaǯs negotiator and 
representative for the Alliance of Small Island States made an impassioned speech at a 
plenary session where he described the increased vulnerability of island states and the 
immediate perils they faced:  ǮThis little island is where I get my dignity from.  I shouldn't be 
transported somewhere else by the whims and fancy of others who want to develop.  While 
they develop, we die.  Why should we accept this?ǯ ȋSheppard, ͚͙͙͘).   Venezuela's 
ambassador, Claudia Salerno accused the UN chair of the session of ignoring the views of 
some developing countries. Referring to the Green Climate Fund, an initiative whereby the 
rich countries would help developing countries to adapt to climate change, she said: ǮThis 
agreement will kill off everyone. It is a farce. It is immoral to ask developing countries to sell 
ourselves for $͙͘͘ billionǯ ȋVidal & (arvey, ͚͙͙͘Ȍ. 
Durban marked a significant shift in the coalitions among developing countries.  
Cracks appeared in traditional alliances such as the BASIC group, despite their public 
affirmations of unity.  Chinaǯs willingness to consider a legally binding treaty for all 
countries subject to equity principles, marked a significant departure from the groupǯs 
earlier position that any legally binding agreement would apply only to industrialized 
countries.  Brazil and South Africa also softened their initial stance on a legally binding 
treaty leaving India isolated.  The Alliance of Small Island States, fearing that Durban would 
go the way of Copenhagen and Cancun in its failure to reach any agreement or worse still, 
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terminate the Kyoto Protocol, was instrumental in forming a new alliance with the Least 
Developed Countries and the European Union in an effort to ensure there would be a 
second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol.  The final confrontation at Durban was 
between the EU and India; two years earlier at Copenhagen it was disagreement between 
the EU and China that prevented any meaningful outcome.   
Much of the impetus of climate negotiations has come from the EU, which is also 
the only party to offer to undertake unconditional emissions reductions.  The other key 
player in global negotiations, the United States, has always resisted committing to 
emissions reductions since the start of the climate change negotiations, despite virtually 
dictating the design of the Kyoto Protocol.  The US position on climate change has 
essentially remained the same — to promote Ǯflexibilityǯ in all arrangements instead of 
enforcing stringent targets on developed countries.  It was at the insistence of the United 
States that emissions trading became the cornerstone of climate policy at the international 
level despite strenuous objections from developing countries and even the EU, which was 
apprehensive that emissions trading could undermine mandatory reduction targets and 
enable the US to avoid taking significant domestic action on emissions reductions (Grubb, 
2004).   
 The US approach to climate change reflects their politico-economic ideology, as 
well as the power of their industry groups. These groups spent more than $100 million in 
lobbying their government not to accept emission reduction commitments unless 
developing countries accepted similar commitments, while also lobbying developing 
countries to oppose any binding commitments because they would threaten the latterǯs 
economic growth.  Grubb (2004: 27) describes the US strategy during early climate change 
negotiations as Ǯone of the most cynical, and successful, international lobbying campaigns 
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in historyǯ.  During the negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol the North-South 
divide almost led to the breakdown of talks — the reason they did not was because the 
objections of major developing countries like China and India were simply overridden and 
the US position was adopted (Grubb et al., 1999).  At Copenhagen and Durban the shifts in 
power were apparent — it was China and India that dominated the talks and influenced the 
outcomes.  At Durban, China was more strategic in developing alliances to support their 
position as opposed to India, leaving the latter isolated from its own group of BASIC 
countries and from other developing countries.  Ministers and senior officials from the 
island states and from the least developed countries participated at almost all the side 
events and workshops organized by the Chinese delegates.  Mirroring strategies adopted 
by the US and EU, China announced several trade and technology assistance programs 
with the least developed countries in a successful effort to garner their support.  
 
Conclusions 
 What conclusions can we draw from the Durban Summit?  What are the significant 
changes, if any, in the political economy of climate change from the first Conference of 
Parties held in Berlin in 1995 to the Durban COP in 2011?  A cynical response would be to 
say that the only outcome that 17 climate change summits have produced (barring the 
landmark Kyoto Protocol) is a general agreement to continue to negotiate.  However, even 
that outcome can be considered remarkable given the enormous complexities of 
negotiating any agreement involving more than 200 countries.  If Berlin was a watershed 
because it was the first time all countries came to the negotiating table, then Durban 
marked a major shift in the traditional alliances that have characterized all the climate 
change summits thus far.  Political alliances at climate change negotiations, once 
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considered Ǯremarkably resilientǯ since the late ͙͘͡͠s ȋGrubb et al., ͙͡͡͡: ͚͡Ȍ shifted 
significantly at Durban.  While the EU continues to be at the forefront of climate change 
negotiations the shift in the economic center of gravity to Asia has undoubtedly influenced 
how these negotiations take place. 
But the shifts in power to large developing countries like China and India by no 
means marks a victory for the poorer countries of the world.  In fact, the opposite is true.  
Putting China and India in the same category with the broad range of developing countries 
as somehow representing the Ǯglobal Southǯ replicates the hegemonic structures that 
created and sustained the North-South divide.  Post-Durban, the climate change hegemon 
now obtains its power from inequalities in South-South relations.  The development 
argument that is so persuasively used by China and India obscures inequities in resource 
access within their respective countries and the sharply rising inequalities between the rich 
and the poor.  While there is no doubt that poverty rates in both countries have declined 
over the last 25 years, income disparities have increased sharply (World Bank, 2009).  Both 
the distribution of energy consumption and the benefits of economic growth are extremely 
unevenly distributed in China and India.  For instance, the richest 10 per cent of urban 
energy consumers in India emit 12 times the amount of carbon as the poorer 50 per cent of 
rural consumers (Parikh & Parikh, 2002).  A burgeoning middle class of urban consumers 
drives most of the energy requirements of both China and India while the energy needs of 
the rural poor tend to be ignored.  
There are some concerns that with all the attention on GHG emissions and energy 
efficiency the broader debate about sustainability, in particular the equity dimension of 
sustainability, seems to have been pushed into the background (Banerjee, 2003).  With the 
apparent abandonment of the equity principle, least developed countries find themselves 
 37 
more vulnerable not only to the physical impacts of climate change but also to the policy 
measures to address climate change.  Adaptation and technology transfer were two key 
policy issues that were central to climate change negotiations but are not mentioned at all 
in the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.  Vulnerability and adaptation to climate 
change are crucial problems for many least developed countries (Beg et al., 2002) that 
require both financial and technological resources but which have not been addressed in 
the Durban Platform.  The proposed Green Climate Fund of $100 billion per year to be paid 
to developing countries is basically an admission of the Northǯs Ǯclimate debtǯ to the South 
(Bond, 2010: 21). 
       In a damning indictment of the climate change negotiation process and of the 
global elites from developing countries that are supposed to represent the interests of their 
impoverished citizens, Sunita Narain, Director General of the Center for Science and 
Environment, an Indian public interest research and advocacy organization, had this to say:  
Our governmentǯs negotiators are the same people who would stymie any real action 
on environmental improvement in the country. They will oppose fuel efficiency 
standards, tax on big cars, or tough penalties for polluters. But they will still talk glibly 
about low carbon economies … The US has provided a perfect formula - it promises us 
the right to pollute, because it wants to legitimize its own pollution. Secondly, it 
promises that we can get a place on the high table of polluters. And as powerful 
conspirators, this will mean that we need to do little ourselves, but instead push the 
price of change on the less favored - the poor of India or the poor anywhere else in the 
world. )tǯs an open offer to protect, not our right to development as we have been 
demanding. But a simpler proposition: we give you the right to pollute (at least for 
now). The other proposition is equally seductive. To the countries, which are not yet 
polluters (from Ethiopia to Maldives), the Copenhagen Accord says we will give money 
 38 
to keep you pliant and agreeable. This is why the Accord promises some fictional 
money to poor vulnerable countries. )tǯs a perfect formula, designed to please all. There 
is only one hitch: we will all have to forget the climate change crisis and its hazards and 
impacts (cited in Bond, 2010: 16). 
In a critical political economy of climate change the Ǯexercise of power in the form of 
economyǯ (Foucualt, 1979: 92) is not the sole provenance of governments but emanates 
from a loosely woven web of interconnected actors and institutions whose interests sustain 
existing material inequalities and forms of political power.  Thus, the key question for a 
more progressive and equitable climate regime is how can groups that are excluded from 
participation at the global level resist policies that undermine their sustainability?  As we 
have seen the institutional processes of climate change negotiations cannot provide 
avenues where agency can be exercised because the organization of these processes 
benefit groups who are able to speak with one voice, which in most cases tends to be 
powerful industry groups (Newell & Paterson, 1999).  And the large, primarily northern 
NGOS that are allowed to participate at climate change negotiations cannot possibly 
represent the sheer diversity of social movements across the world.  For example, several 
local groups in Europe and the United States have resorted to direct action to stop the 
expansion of polluting industries.  Justifying their actions because of what they feel is 
Ǯlegislative gridlockǯ around climate change these groups have been successful in stopping 
new coal fired plants from being built in the UK using a variety of grassroots based direct 
action (Adam & Tran, 2009).  Rural communities in many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America are also engaged in struggles with states and multinational over resource access 
(Banerjee, 2011b).  Perhaps these grassroots based direct actions and localized political 
interventions represent a strategic form of power that can enable local actors to exert some 
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influence over the global climate agenda (Levy & Egan, 2003).  These local struggles and 
resistance movements are ultimately about seeking new ways of participatory decision-
making on the global governance of climate change.  From a critical perspective governing 
the political economy of climate change has less to do with how markets can penetrate 
climate change regimes but more to do with how marginalized and impoverished 
communities who are non-corporate, non-state and often non-market actors can ensure 
that climate change regimes do not threaten their survival (Banerjee, 2010; 2011a). 
In their analysis of the Copenhagen climate change summit Carter et al. (2011) 
concluded that ultimately the politics of domination prevailed over the politics of 
legitimacy.  Perhaps the same could be said of Durban, with one crucial difference: the 
elites from a few South countries have become key players in the politics of domination 
both in their interactions with the North, with other South countries, as well as with civil 
society actors in their own regions.  If effective global regulation is the only way to address 
climate change, it is difficult to see how such regulation can emerge out of COP meetings 
post-Durban given the politics of domination described earlier.  At best governments will 
address climate change at the national level on a voluntary basis, which then underscores 
the importance of direct action at the local level to prevent the expansion of polluting 
industries.  Thus, reclaiming space for public discussion and even intervention at different 
sites of decision-making becomes an important task for implementing democratically 
derived principles of climate justice (Banerjee, 2011b). 
Research and policy addressing concerns about sustainability and climate change 
have coalesced around one central question: how do we make economic growth 
environmentally and socially sustainable?  Answers that emerge from framing 
environmental and social problems as risks to growth can only serve to sustain regimes of 
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accumulation.  Perhaps it is time we start addressing another question, one that requires a 
profound shift in our collective imagination that can enable a radical re-visioning from 
regimes of accumulation to regimes of distribution: how do we make a low environmental 
impact lifestyle, with reduced consumption and standard of living among wealthier 
populations economically sustainable? 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research was supported by funding from the Australian Research Grants Discovery 
Scheme.  I thank the reviewers and the action editor David Courpasson for their valuable 
comments. 
 41 
References 
Adam, D., & Tran, M. (2009).  Kingsnorth power station plans shelved by E.ON.  The  
Guardian, October 7. http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/oct/07/eon- 
cancels-kingsnorth-power-station. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Banerjee, S.B. (2003).  Who sustains whose development?  Sustainable development and  
the reinvention of nature. Organization Studies, 24(1), 143–180.  
Banerjee, S.B. (2010).  Governing the global corporation: A critical perspective.  Business  
Ethics Quarterly, 20(2), 265-274.   
Banerjee, S.B. (2011a).  Embedding sustainability across the organization: A critical  
perspective.  Academy of Management Learning & Education, 10(4), 719–731. 
Banerjee, S.B.  (2011b).  Voices of the governed: Towards a theory of the translocal.  
Organization, 18(3), 323–344.  
Banerjee, S.B., & Bonnefous, A. (2011).  Stakeholder management and sustainability  
strategies in the French nuclear industry.  Business Strategy and the Environment, 
20, 24–40. 
Beg, N., Morlot, J. C., Davidson, O., Afrane-Okesse, Y., Tyani, L., Denton, F., et al. (2002).
 Linkages between climate change and sustainable development. Climate Policy, 
 2(2-3),129–144. 
Bond, P. (2010 ). Maintaining momentum after Copenhagen's collapse: Seal the deal or  
ǮSeattleǯ the deal? Capitalism Nature Socialism, 21(1), 14–27. 
Bond, P. (2011).  From Copenhagen to Cancún to Durban: Moving deckchairs on the  
climate Titanic.  Capitalism Nature Socialism, 22(2), 3–26. 
Böhm, S., & Dabhi, S. (eds)(2009).  Upsetting the offset: The political economy of carbon  
markets. London: Mayfly. 
 42 
Bumpus, A. G., & Livermann, D. M. (2008).  Accumulation by decarbonization and the 
governance of carbon offsets. Economic Geography, 84(2),127–155. 
Carrington, D. (2010).  WikiLeaks cables reveal how US manipulate climate accord. The 
Guardian, December 3. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/dec/03/wikileaks-us-manipulated-
climate-accord. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Carter, C., Clegg, S., & Wåhlin, N. (2011).  When science meets strategic realpolitik: The 
case  
of the Copenhagen UN climate change summit.  Critical Perspectives on  
Accounting, 22, 682–697.  
China Times (2011).  US and European solar firms may sue China over subsidies.  China  
Times, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass- 
cnt.aspx?id=20111001000014&cid=1102. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Clark, P. (2010). Climate change: The great regrouping.  Financial Times,  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5f3a2868-2654-11e1-85fb-00144feabdc0.html. 
Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Cox, R.W. (1981).  Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations  
theory. Millennium: Journal of International Relations, 10(2), 126–155. 
Deetz, S. (1992).  Democracy in an age of corporate colonization: Developments in  
communication and the politics of everyday life.  Albany: State University of New 
York Press.  
Depledge, J. (2004).  The organization of global negotiations: Constructing the climate  
change regime. London: Earthscan. 
Donzelot, J. (1988).  The promotion of the social.  Economy and Society, 17: 395–427. 
 43 
 
Fernandes, S., & Girard, R. (2011). Corporations, climate and the United Nations: How big  
business has seized control of global climate negotiations.  Polaris Institute.  
http://www.polarisinstitute.org/corporations_climate_and_the_un. Accessed  
September 15, 2012. 
Foucault, M. (1979).  Governmentality.  In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), The  
Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality  (pp. 87–104).  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Genova, W. (2011).  Canada out of Kyoto protocol, cites failure of climate change treaty.  
International Business Times, 
http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/266676/20111214/canada-withdraws-kyoto-protocol-
peter-kent.htm.  Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Gordon, C. (1991).  Government rationality:  An introduction. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, &  
P. Miller (Eds.), The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality  (pp. 1–52).  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks.  New York: International  
Publishers. 
Grubb, M., Vrolijk, C., & Brack, D. (1999). The Kyoto Protocol: A guide and assessment.  
London: RIIA/Earthscan. 
Grubb, M. (2004).  Kyoto and the future of international climate change responses: From  
here to where?  International Review for Environmental Strategies, 5(1), 15–38. 
Harvey, F. & Carrington, D. (2011). Durban climate conference agrees deal to do a deal:  
Now comes the hard partǯ. The Guardian, December 12, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/12/durban-climate-change-
 44 
conference-2011-southafrica. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Hoffman, A. (2005).  Climate change strategy:  The business logic behind voluntary  
greenhouse gas reductions. California Management Review, 47(3), 21–46. 
Jayaraman, T. (2011).  Post-Durban India has its task cut out.  The Hindu, December 20.  
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2729539. Accessed September 15,  
2012. 
Keating, D. (2011). A climate deal against the odds.  European Voice, 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/a-climate-deal-against-the-odds-
/72961.aspx. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Kolk, A., & Pinske, J. (2005).  Business response to climate change:  Identifying emergent  
 strategies. California Management Review, 47(3), 6–20.   
Krasner, S. D. (1982).  Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening  
variables. International Organization, 36(2): 185–205. 
Levy, D. L., & Egan, D.  (2003).  A neo-Gramscian approach to corporate political strategy:  
Conflict and accommodation in the climate change negotiations. Journal of 
Management Studies, 40(4), 803–829. 
Lohmann, L. (2011).  The endless algebra of climate markets. Capitalism Nature Socialism,  
22(4), 93–116. 
Macalister, T. (2011).  BP axes solar business.  The Guardian, December 21.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/21/bp-axe-solar-power- 
business. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
McAfee, K. (1999).  Selling nature to save it? Biodiversity and green developmentalism.   
Environment and Planning D ,17(2),133–154. 
Newell, P., & Paterson, M. (1998).  A climate for business: Global warming, the state and  
 45 
capital. Review of International Political Economy, 5(4), 679–703. 
 
Okereke, C., & McDaniels, D. (2012). To what extent are EU steel companies susceptible to 
competitive loss due to climate policy?  Energy Policy, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.03.052.  Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Parikh, J., & Parikh, K. ȋ͚͚͘͘Ȍ.  Climate change: )ndiaǯs perceptions, positions, policies  
and possibilities. Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research.  
http://www.indiawaterportal.org/node/10568. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Payne, A. (2005). The global politics of unequal development.  New York: Palgrave  
Macmillan. 
Perrow, C. (1979).  Complex organizations: A critical essay.  New York:  Random House. 
Reuters (2009). US airlines sue over EU emissions regulations.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/18/us-usa-climate-airlines-
idUSTRE5BH4RA20091218. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Reuters (2011).  U.N. climate talks agree legal pact on global warming.  
http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/11/. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Rovics, D. (2010).  Report from Copenhagen.  Capitalism Nature Socialism, 21(1), 3–7. 
Sheppard, K. (2011).  The Durban deal.  Mother Jones, http://motherjones.com/blue- 
marble/2011/12/durban-deal. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Saran, S. (2010).  Irresistible forces and immovable objects: a debate on contemporary 
climate politics. Climate Policy ,10(6),678–683. 
Stavins, R. (2011).  The platform opens a window: An unambiguous consequence of the 
Durban Climate talks.  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-stavin/.  Accessed 
September 15, 2012. 
 46 
 
 
The Economist (2011). Climate change: Durban and everything that matters.  The  
Economist  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/12/climate-change.   
Accessed September15, 2012. 
The Guardian (2010a).  U.S. Embassy cables: E.U. raises Ǯcreative accountingǯ with U.S. over  
climate aid. December 3. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables- 
documents/249185. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
The Guardian (2010b). U.S. Embassy cables: Maldives tout $50m climate projects to U.S.  
 December 3. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables- 
documents/251174. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
The Guardian (2010c).  U.S. Embassy cables: U.S. urges Ethiopia to back Copenhagen  
climate accord. December 3. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-
documents/246644. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
The Guardian (2011).  International airlines will be charged for carbon emissions, EU court 
rules.  December 21. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/21/international-airlines-carbon-
emissions. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Utting, P., & Zammit, A. (2006).  Beyond pragmatism: Appraising UN-business 
partnerships.  Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Markets, Business and 
Regulation Programme Paper Number 1. 
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/462fc27bd1fce00880256b4a00
 47 
60d2af/225508544695e8f3c12572300038ed22/$file/uttzam.pdf. Accessed 
September 15, 2012. 
 
Vidal, J., & Harvey, F. (2011).  Climate deal salvaged after marathon talks in Durbanǯ.  The  
Observer, December 11.  www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/10/un- 
climate-change-summit-durban?newsfeed=true. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
World Bank (2009).  An assessment of poverty and inequality in China.  http://www- 
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/04/08/0003
34955_20090408062432/Rendered/PDF/473490SR0CN0P010Disclosed0041061091.
pdf. Accessed September 15, 2012. 
Xinhua News Agency (2011).  BASIC countries remain united over climate change.  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2011-12/07/. Accessed September 15,  
2012. 
  
 48 
Event Summary Key Participants 
Plenary sessions Conference of parties 
The Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
(AWG-KP) 
Negotiating group of 37 industrialized 
countries 
The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention 
(AWG-LCA) 
Negotiating group of 195 countries 
Making the transition to low carbon 
societies in a changing world 
Panelists from the EU (scientists and 
government officials) 
Country-level climate change and impacts EU panelists 
Climate change: Perspectives from India and 
Bangladesh 
Panelists from government, industry 
associations and NGOs 
Carbon capture and storage Panelists from research organizations, 
industry associations and EU governments  
Climate justice Panelists from NGOs and governments 
Financing climate change EU panelists from government and banking 
sectors 
Civil society in developing countries Panelists from India, Bangladesh and South 
Africa.  Organized by EU 
Green climate fund Panelists from the banking sector 
Private sector solutions Panelists from industry associations 
Low carbon Asia Panelists from government, NGOs and 
industry associations 
Carbon pricing World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development panelists from transnational 
corporations 
Integrating energy efficiency across the 
power sector value chain 
World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development panelists from corporations in 
the power sector 
Sustainable forests World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development panelists from transnational 
corporations and governments. 
Innovation and intellectual property rights Panelists from government agencies and 
industry groups in China 
Low emissions development EU panelists 
Climate change strategy and trends Government and industry officials from 
China 
The green economy EU panelists 
Emissions trading Panelists from the International Emissions 
Trading Association 
South-south cooperation Government officials from China, Grenada 
and Bangladesh 
Country impacts EU panelists (scientists) 
Climate change and the power sector CEOs and Directors from power companies 
in the EU and USA 
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Low carbon future EU panelists 
Event Summary Key Participants 
Learning platform NGOs from EU 
Carbon markets EU panelists from government and industry 
Forum on energy efficiency  Panelists from China 
Business risk and public policy Panelists from transnational corporations 
and industry associations 
Germanyǯs low carbon and energy strategy Panelists from government and industry 
Climate diplomacy EU panelists 
Green growth Panelists from the EU, India and South 
Africa 
Low carbon enterprises Government and industry panelists from 
China 
Competitiveness implications for mining 
and metals 
Panelists from the International Council on 
Mining and Metals 
Principles for climate change policy design  Panelists from the International Council on 
Mining and Metals 
The role of mining and metals in land use 
and adaptation 
Panelists from the International Council on 
Mining and Metals 
Who's holding us back? How carbon 
intensive industry is preventing effective 
climate legislation 
Workshop organized by Greenpeace 
Climate villain awards Performance organized by Friends of the 
Earth 
Daily press briefings Media, COP delegates and press secretaries 
 
 
Table 1 
Data Source Events 
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Key Actors Description 
Conference of the Parties (COP) Decision making group.  Consists of 194 countries 
plus the European Union 
Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP) 
Decision making group.  The Protocolǯs top body 
consisting of 193 parties.  Meets annually at the 
same time as the COP 
The Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-
KP) 
Negotiating group.  Consists of 37 industrialized 
Annex I countries 
The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention 
(AWG-LCA) 
Negotiating group. Consists of 195 countries 
Subsidiary Body Implementation (SBI) Expert group that provides advice to the 
negotiating groups 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) 
Expert group that provides advice to the 
negotiating groups 
Annex I countries Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United 
States and the European Union representing 27 
countries.  Includes countries with economies in 
transition (the EIT Parties) such as the Russian 
Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central 
and Eastern European States 
Annex II countries Consist of the OECD members of Annex I, but not 
the Economies in Transition (EIT) Parties.  Annex II 
countries are required to provide financial 
resources to enable developing countries to 
undertake emissions reduction activities under the 
Convention and to help them adapt to adverse 
effects of climate change 
Non Annex I parties: 
 
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 
 
The African Group 
 
Least Developed Countries Group 
 
G77 and China 
Developing countries 
 
Consists of 42 island states and low lying countries 
 
53 member states 
 
48 member states 
 
132 member states with rotating chairmanship 
between Africa, Asia and Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Environmental NGOs, business and industry 
NGOs, local government and municipal 
authorities, Indigenous peoplesǯ organizations, 
research-oriented and independent NGOs 
 
Table 2 
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Key Actors in Climate Change Negotiations  
 53 
Negotiating Group Position on Climate Change 
G77 and China  Preserve and strengthen Kyoto Protocol 
Africa Group  Preserve and strengthen Kyoto Protocol  Protect principles of Ǯcommon but differentiated 
responsibilityǯ and equity  Mandatory global regime with strong compliance provisions 
and enforcement penalties  Financial and technological support to be provided to 
developing countries to implement adaptation plans  Removal of all barriers that prevent technology transfer 
including removal of patents on climate related technologies 
Least Developed Countries  Legally binding instrument that accepts principle of Ǯcommon 
but differentiated responsibilityǯ  Second commitment period for Kyoto Protocol  Compliance regime and international verification to monitor 
emissions from developed countries 
Alliance of Small Island 
States 
 Second commitment period for Kyoto Protocol 
 
India  Opposed to any new legally binding treaty  No legally binding emission targets for developing countries  Any future agreement to be bases on principles of Ǯcommon 
but differentiated responsibilityǯ and equity 
BASIC group (Brazil, South 
Africa, India, China) 
 Preserve principle of Ǯcommon but differentiated 
responsibilityǯ  Strengthen the unity of G77 and China to represent a unified 
voice of developing countries in climate change negotiations 
United States  ǮPledge and reviewǯ scheme instead of agreed and enforceable 
mitigation commitments  Any agreement must have legal parity – rejects principle of 
Ǯcommon but differentiated responsibilityǯ 
European Union  Single legally binding treaty for developed and developing 
countries  Second commitment period for Kyoto Protocol 
China  Second commitment period for Kyoto Protocol  Not averse to legally binding emissions reduction obligations 
post-͚͚͘͘ provided they are based on principle of Ǯcommon 
but differentiated responsibilityǯ 
 
 
Table 3 
Key negotiating groups and their positions at Durban* 
 
* Adapted from United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change COP17/CMP7: 
Guide to Negotiations.  )nstitut de lǯenergie et de lǯenvironnement de la Francophonie 
(IEPF, 2011). www.iepf.org. 
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Figure 1 
 
Total and per capita CO2 emissions of the ten biggest emitters* 
 
*Source: Energy Information Administration (2011). 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8. 
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